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The paper views migration of skills from a perspective of new industrial policy. It 
introduces two types of search networks: open migration chains and diaspora networks. 
Migration chains are sequences of educational or job opportunities which allows a 
migrant to move to progressively complex educational and job tasks necessary to work 
in the global environment. Diaspora networks are networks of diaspora members to 
advance their collective goals, often (but not necessarily) for the benefits of home 
countries. Open migration chains are functional equivalent of value chains: they 
emphasize upgrading of individual human capital. ‘Diaspora networks’ is about 
concerted action and clubs. They can be viewed as tools to upgrade open migration 
chains exactly the same way as a supplier development programme is a concerted action 
to upgrade value chains. The paper is both ambitious and humble. It is ambitiously  
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optimistic because emerging migration ladders open an opportunity of a win-win 
situation; an evolving virtuous cycle of co-development of migrant human capital and 
home country institutions. It is humble, however, in recognizing intricacies of policy 
solutions to make it happen: creation of robust diaspora networks requires substantial 
amount of time, patience and institutional capabilities. Above all, good expatriate 
networks—as any search networks—tend to generate opportunities and projects but 
someone else has to act on those opportunities and finance the projects. Capabilities of 
government and private sector stakeholders remain the key: diaspora networks are no 
panacea. 
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1  Introduction: global migration of talent as an opportunity 
All the very valid concern about brain drain from developing countries not-
withstanding, this chapter argues for and demonstrates the possibility of ‘win-win’ 
positive dynamics benefiting both sending countries and migrants themselves. Such a 
virtuous cycle is illustrated by India and greater China, where it is more relevant to talk 
about ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain exchange’ rather than habitual ‘brain drain’ (see 
Saxenian 2006). But even in cases of low-skilled migration, such as migration from 
Mexico, one can find evidence of mutually beneficial gains. Yet the win-win dynamics 
we argue for is not automatic. It is a gradual step-by-step process which requires 
ingenuity and creativity to trigger. 
To stress the possibility of such virtuous dynamics, we introduce two key notions: open 
migration chains and diaspora networks. Open migration chains are sequences of 
educational or job opportunities, which allow a migrant to move to progressively 
complex educational and job tasks necessary to work in the global environment. 
Diaspora networks (or expatriate networks) are the locus of concerted action by 
expatriates to promote their collective interests or to help them engage in their home 
countries. The notion of diaspora networks is not to be confused with a familiar notion 
of diasporas—a totality of individuals living abroad (as illustrated by Jewish Diaspora 
or Armenian Diaspora). Diasporas are composed of a surprising variety of diaspora 
networks, some of them constructive and useful from the perspective of a virtuous cycle 
we discuss here, but some are not necessarily so (if for instance a central concern of 
certain diaspora members is political and defensive, thereby dividing and alienating 
rather than bringing together the members for a shared agenda of change). By focusing 
on diaspora networks (micro-level phenomenon) rather than diasporas (macro-level 
phenomenon), we stress this heterogeneity and spontaneity of action. 
To understand open migration chains and diaspora networks, we put it into the context 
of the profound change in the organization of firms and value chains.  In the last quarter 
century the textbook firm has gone from centralized and closed to decentralized or 
networked and open. At bottom this transformation reflects a profound and general 
innovation in the way we address cooperative problem solving. It was axiomatic for the 
nineteenth and much of the twentieth century that problems beyond the reach of our 
individually limited capacities could only be solved by decomposing them, according to 
a master plan, into narrow, easily learned tasks, and then combining the results into the 
desired output. Today, in contrast, we increasingly solve such problems by looking for 
others who are already solving (a part of) the problem we are facing. The central 
organizational challenge is accordingly not the management of the hierarchy that 
decomposes tasks and assembles outputs, but rather constructing the search networks 
that allow us to find and collaborate with those who are already learning what we need 
to know. This shift from hierarchy to search network has profound effects on global 
supply chains, and therefore on strategies of economic development—new industrial 
strategies—in general, and on the role of high and low skill diaspora networks in 
particular.  
Section 2 indicates how a shift in the mobility possibilities of immigrants/migrants leads 
to a transformative fusion of traditional migration chains (in which the success of one 
villager in a low-skill job abroad attracts first one neighbour or cousin, then the next)   2
and internal job ladders (where high-skill employers work and learn moving from one 
task to a hierarchically more demanding one within a closed corporation) into open 
migration chains: the pattern, characteristic of high-skill diasporas, where migration 
chains (including flows back and forth between host and sending countries) grow where 
early migrants discover the possibility of acquiring at school and work the skills needed 
to participate at higher and higher levels in many, loosely linked firms in some sector of 
the decentralizing world economy. Section 3 highlights a new role of diasporas as 
search networks—as bridges between capabilities at home and opportunities abroad. 
Section 4 summarizes tentative lessons on how to organize deliberate action to 
institutionalize a variety of existing diaspora networks into search networks. More 
analytical sections 5 and 6 put the strands together by examining the global context of 
profound restructuring of value chains. Section 5 presents a compressed account of the 
innovative institutional mechanisms that undergird the new forms of collaboration and 
shows how these mechanisms explain transformations in supply chains that elude other 
interpretations. Section 6 outlines respective policy implications which we call, 
provisionally and tentatively, new industrial policy. Interventions to promote open 
migration chains and diaspora networks is one example of such ‘new industrial policy’. 
Section 7 provides conclusions. 
We do not pretend to give a full theoretical account of the changes under consideration, 
and still less to weigh all the evidence for and against the conclusions we draw. Our 
purpose rather is to present a unified account of developments normally treated as 
distinct policy domains, and thereby to call attention to connections among current 
problems and possible responses to them that may be of interest to practitioners leery of 
both partial, potentially incompatible solutions and disjointed theoretical discussions 
that reinforce traditional distinctions rather than helping to overcome them. 
2  From job ladders to open migration chains 
Much of labour market theory of the late twentieth century was focused on industrial 
jobs. Within that broad domain, it was common, perhaps standard, to treat migration 
between countries as concerning low-skilled workers, and to treat skill acquisition as 
occurring through learning on the job within the large, hierarchically organized 
corporation described above. Given the organization of production in those firms, 
moreover, most learning was plant or firm specific: it followed from the decomposition 
of large projects, such as design and production of a car, into small, linked tasks, that 
the machines needed for any step would be highly specialized and tightly matched in its 
specifications to the machine that produced its input and the machine that used its 
output. Machines designed to be used only with other machines in such a sequence are 
called asset specific—they have no value for any other use. By the same logic, the skills 
needed to operate each machine consisted in the largely tacit knowledge of the 
peculiarities of that machine in relation to upstream and downstream operations. (The 
knowledge was almost sure to be largely tacit, because the machines, in relation to their 
neighbours, were effectively unique, and formalization, at least in the then current view, 
was the statement of the general features of some process or situation.) Workers with 
little or no formal education learned these skills by progressing from machine   
to machine, and absorbing from more experienced colleagues, not from books, the 
highly specialized knowledge they needed. These job sequences were called job   
ladders. It was a sign of the importance of tacit knowledge in these job ladders and the 
economy as a whole that returns to formal education were low—for many workers in   3
the US, for instance, there was little penalty, in lifetime earnings, for quitting high 
school or skipping college because the skills needed for responsible, high paying jobs 
could be acquired in many cases by an industrial ‘apprenticeship’ in a particular factory 
or firm. 
It was a further feature of this world that migration and skill acquisition were distinct 
phenomena. Migrants were presumed, correctly, to be seeking higher incomes, and 
vastly increased possibilities for savings, but not new skills, when they went abroad. 
Their goal was to remit as much as possible to their families at home while working in 
the receiving country, and to return as soon as possible, and with as much wealth as 
possible, to their home countries. They were not interested in investing in skill 
acquisition as they were not planning to stay abroad long enough to reap the returns in 
their investment. However unattractive, low-skill jobs were acceptable because they 
paid wages that were extraordinary high by home country standards. Given these goals, 
they lived in effect in a no-man’s land between their home and their (temporary) 
destination. Often they in fact circulated back and forth, as economic and family 
circumstances dictated. They were, to use famous phrase, ‘birds of passage’. The guest 
workers brought to Western European factories in the 1960s and 1970s fit this pattern 
perfectly, but they had many forbearers from the late nineteenth century on. 
A central problem for these birds of passage was, and remains, the identification of 
plentiful, geographically concentrated supplies of low-skill jobs over long distances. 
The jobs had to be plentiful and close together because, being low skilled and thus 
undifferentiated, there could be no guarantee that any particular one would prove stable. 
Migrants had to compensate for the potential instability of any one job by the easy 
availability of others, all so close to each other that changing jobs did not require 
changing homes. Finding such jobs required scanning many possible destinations for a 
single piece of information: are jobs available at this place for people ‘like us’. An 
efficient way to scan was to rely on a network of relatives, friends and acquaintances 
from one’s home village as they were also looking for unskilled jobs abroad. Members 
or nodes in this network know little about each other—they rarely have worked or done 
business together, for instance—but they know all that is needed, for purposes of the 
joint search, about labour market conditions. Links of this kind—rich in information 
about a particular, thin slice of the world, poor in information about the character and 
abilities of the network members—are called weak ties; and the migration flows that 
result from a network of weak ties directing migrants from a given origin to follow the 
news of plentiful, low skill jobs to a common destination is a migration chain. 
A key consequence of the shift to networked organization based on search networks 
rather than hierarchy is to ‘de-specify’ machines and skills—to make both more general 
purpose. Assume, as we did above, that a firm knows in advance that it cannot be sure 
what products it will be making two years from now, and how any of those products 
will be designed until many outsiders have revised initial projects. In that case it 
sacrifices some of the efficiency that comes with a machine that can do one thing and 
one thing only; rather it buys general purpose machines that can easily be 
reprogrammed to do many different operations. The shift means, however, that learning 
to shift from operation to operation with a given, large domain, and, more broadly still, 
learning to learn, become master skills, each based on substantial bodies of formal 
knowledge. There is less and less wholly unskilled work and even the relatively 
unskilled work is no longer plant specific: think of the general team-working skills 
needed by workers doing assembly work in just-in-time factories. A crude but revealing   4
measure of this shift is the rapidly increasing returns to formal education, and the 
corresponding increase in the gap between the lifetime wages of unskilled and skilled, 
not to say professional workers. 
Potential migrants, of course, notice this shift. Those with good educational prospects at 
home go abroad to get still better ones, and then jobs that enable them to learn even 
more. Those with lesser opportunities start to think about improving them abroad, 
fearing that their long-term employability depends on their doing so. Instead of looking 
for destinations with plentiful unskilled jobs, migrants begin to look for destinations that 
offer many possibilities for skill acquisition at work or in school. As job ladders are 
transformed into more open, inter-firm, and more formally skilled labour markets, and 
weak ties among migrants begin to communicate information about learning 
possibilities, migration chains become open mobility networks—means for discovering 
where to go to learn how to learn to prosper in the reorganizing economy. High-skill 
diasporas are a conspicuous example of such networks. 
Proliferation of professional association of diaspora members is evidence of this 
transition from thin to thick search networks. Associations such as the association of 
doctors of Armenian origin in the US or the Association of Engineers from Latin 
America are formed precisely as such ‘thick’ networks to help members identify 
opportunities for professional advancement. Mentoring—when more experienced and 
successful members who already ‘made it’ share their personal networks and knowledge 
with younger members who are just entering their migration chains—is a central feature 
of these associations. Perhaps the most famous and successful organisation of this 
kind—The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE) was started in 1992 as a conduit for experienced 
Indians to mentor others and to provide a broad forum for networking and learning for 
its members. TiE is an institutionalised search network to help its members to move up 
in their migration chains. 
Even more significantly, this change affects not only professional associations; it now 
extends beyond skilled migrants defined as those with tertiary degrees. Hometown 
associations of migrants of Mexican origin (there are more than 70 of those in the US) 
were started in the 1950s with a primary objective to defend the rights of (often illegal) 
labour migrants from Mexico, the vast majority of them unskilled. Hometown 
associations used to be paragons of institutionalized but thin search networks which 
identified job opportunities, provided mutual help (including practical ways to live and 
work as an illegal) from local communities of Mexico. Migrants from Zacatecas (a poor 
state in the centre-north of Mexico), for instance, have a hometown association in 
almost every major US city. But with time, and as many migrants became legal and 
progressed in their migration chains from hamburger-flippers to supervisors of these 
hamburger-flippers two things started to happen. 
First, an acute shortage of native-speaking supervisors and shop-floor managers has 
started to occur. Migrants from Mexico do not speak fluent English. If only for this 
reason, their managers better be their compatriots. Seizing the opportunity of migrants 
as a rapidly growing market is another compelling reason. So significant is the shortage 
of certain Spanish-speaking managerial positions that identifying and training such   5
managers is now a central task of the Association of Latin American professionals.1 
Naturally, open-ended migrants’ organizations such as Mexico’s home-town 
associations see this opportunity and contribute to this transformation but introduce 
mentoring too. For example, they direct their members to appropriate training 
programmes and other job advancement opportunities. What started as a paragon of a 
thin search network of low-skilled migrants is showing signs of transformation to thick 
search networks to move the members along their migration chain. 
But the story does not end here. As migrants progress along their migration chain and 
acquire self-confidence which comes with personal and professional success, they start 
thinking about giving to and helping not just their families but the communities they 
came from. Hometown associations from Zacatecas, in collaboration with the state 
government of Zacatecas, designed and co-financed a highly successful three-for-one 
programme of investment in community infrastructure: small roads, schools, hospitals, 
etc. in their home communities (Torres 2005). The programme is called three-for-one 
because for every peso the hometown associations put in; state and federal governments 
contribute another peso each. Although the vast majority of members of hometown 
associations are not wealthy, surpassingly and counter-intuitively, the binding constraint 
for this programme of collective remittances has always been contributions from the 
Mexico government, not the donations of the migrants (Torres 2005). Financial 
transfers are not even the most important aspect of collective remittance—governance 
and monitoring is. Community infrastructure projects in question need to be identified, 
financed and managed through a network of very diverse stakeholders which (used to) 
have little trust in each other: municipal government, users of the infrastructure, 
migrants, etc. As migrants are contributing their own money, they are highly motivated 
to make the project succeed rather than decay as often happens with public work 
projects. But to make them work, they need to monitor them, both from a distance and 
through frequent visits to their home town. The diaspora network in this example is a 
transnational search network: diaspora members work with stakeholders at home to 
design, co-finance and govern projects to benefit their communities at home.  
The implicit evolution at work here mirrors one advancement in the migration chain. As 
migrants advance from low-paid and low-skilled labour to higher-paid and higher-
skilled, they acquire confidence to think about club goods of giving back to the 
communities of their home countries. Thin search networks of simple job searches 
evolve first into thick search networks of professional advancement, mentoring and 
learning and then into diaspora networks contributing to their home countries. Whether 
these three things—simple job search, professional advancement and engagement to 
contribute to home countries—are stages of the process or its functions, is an open 
question. Tentative evidence we have from diaspora networks of India, Mexico, and 
Armenia signals that it is difficult to skip stages and it is more accurate to think about 
them as a succession of stages. But it does not mean, for instance, that an association of, 
say, Argentinean professionals in the US should wait decades before designing a 
meaningful agenda of giving back at home or that it should mimic the evolution of other 
professional associations such as TiE. 
                                                 
1   A. Peralta, head of the association. Conversation with the author (Y. Kuznetsov) during the meeting of 
professionals of Mexican origin with Mexico’s president V. Fox. The meeting was organized by 
CONACYT (Mexico’s Ministry for Science and Technology) and CEO of AMD (a Mexican himself) 
in New York on 24 and 25 September 2003.   6
Motivation to get engaged with the home country is decidedly intrinsic (i.e. it comes 
from inside rather than as a response to a set of incentives): participation is its own 
reward. Intrinsic motivation is a central concern of so-called third-force psychology—it 
does not provide a conclusive answer. Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs argues 
convincingly that one needs to satisfy basic needs before indulging in the luxury of self-
actualization (Maslow 1971). Yet on the other hand, Viktor Frankl provides a no less 
compelling personal account of how self-actualization became a pre-condition for mere 
survival (see his personal story of life in harsh environment of a concentration camp, 
Frankl 1962). To the extent that diasporas are called forth in critical moments of crisis 
and transition (think about present-day Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel in the 1940s and 
1950s, and Armenia in the 1990s), these issues are central to a rapidly growing literature 
on how to elicit contributions from diaspora members to benefit their home countries, 
yet they are rarely discussed. When asked why she abandoned the comfort and security 
of her home to come to a newly formed Israel, Golda Meir responded, paradoxically, 
that it was ‘pure selfishness’. The task was so challenging and huge that ‘I must be a 
part of it. Just pure selfishness, I suppose’ (Meir quoted in Hirschman 1977). 
In what follows, we focus on diaspora networks as transnational search networks that 
evolved enough to engage in projects in home countries. 
3  Diaspora networks as transnational search networks 
It is well known that expatriates have played a critical role in accelerating technology 
exchange and foreign direct investment in the economies of India, China and Israel. 
They have frequently taken the role of pioneer investors at a time when major capital 
markets regarded these economies as too risky. For some, there is non-financial intrinsic 
motivation for an early stage of participation. Others have effective mechanisms for risk 
mitigation that are not available to other investors. Many other nations now have the 
combination of successful expatriate communities and economies regarded as too risky 
for mainstream investors. Some economies have enjoyed significant FDI but face the 
challenge of moving to higher knowledge-intensive development (Latin American 
economies, new EU members). Expatriates abroad can serve as an entry point into new 
markets. 
Yet there is something profoundly elusive in defining diaspora contributions to home 
countries. First, when the role of diasporas is most useful, it is most difficult to define. 
For instance, in the end of the 1990s Korean chaebols such as Samsung were no longer 
able to obtain key technologies from USA multinationals through licensing, which were 
their routine channels for decades: Samsung was considered too advanced and 
technologies were too critical to warrant such licensing. An expensive government 
programme—a pre-competitive stage consortium—was put together by the Korean 
government to deal with the problem, and it failed because the chaebols have little trust 
in each other and experience in private-to-private concerted action. Yet where high 
intensity government programme failed, light touch diaspora intervention succeeded. A 
small network of Koreans working for cutting edge firms proved critical in identifying 
binding constraints and designing ways to obtain and transfer necessary knowledge. 
Some of them came back to Korea to work for the chaebols in question while others 
remained in the US as antennas for the expertise. A transnational search network again. 
Note that their contribution was not reverse engineering and much less industrial   7
espionage. They helped to identify the critical constraints, ways to solve them and ways 
to identify the relevant technical knowledge in the US. They were a search network, but 
someone else—the Korean chaebols, the government and the spin-offs of the Korean 
chaebols—needed to act on their leads. 
Second, while the strength and magnitude of the talent abroad is important, the strength 
of home country institutions to utilize the talent abroad is critical. Thus Chile, Korea, or 
Scotland—countries with strong institutions—utilize their diasporas well, whereas 
Armenia or Argentina fail to take advantage of their talent in spite of many 
programmes. Yet another set of countries such as Russia, Bosnia, or Ukraine does not 
even see their talent abroad as an opportunity. 
Third, although successful cases of diaspora engagement are relatively rare, when they 
do happen it is not due to a deliberate intervention. In most cases diasporas and 
expatriate networks emerge spontaneously as a manna solution. Serendipity—a happy 
coincidence—seems to be much more important than government interventions. 
These are the three paradoxes of diasporas. Our explanation of these paradoxes is the 
following. A prevalent view is that engagement of the diaspora is about a well-defined 
full-time job (or its part-time equivalent): investor, consultant, lawyer, philanthropist, 
business angel is currently prevalent but it is basically incorrect. That of course may 
happen, but a lot of steps have to be taken before. We argue, however, that the 
expatriates are more important and useful as bridges, translators and midwives: they 
open the doors and make connections but someone else still has to do the job. In 
contrast, a common perception is that they are somehow best suited ‘to do the job’. This 
is why government and the private sector of the home country are so crucial: they need 
to do the job, not the diaspora members themselves. Diasporas may be crucial to help 
formulate new and innovative projects but it is up to home country organizations to 
implement it. But since those are often weak and rudimentary, diasporas are viewed as 
substitutes of this weakness. This is an expectation, which is understandable but wrong. 
Diaspora members are no substitutes, they are complements to activities of home 
country organizations. This of course means also that diasporas can be very 
instrumental in strengthening home country organizations. 
To illustrate how it works, let us give an example of an institutional and successful 
search network, GlobalScot, and two diaspora networks in the making, one in Chile and 
another in Mexico. 
GlobalScot is a highly innovative and highly successful programme to form a network 
of about 800 high-powered Scots all over the world and use their expertise and 
influence as ‘antennas’, ‘bridges’ and springboards to generate a surprising variety of 
projects in Scotland. Box 1 conveys a gist of this diversity. Interestingly, although 
GlobalScot relies on all the strengths of Scottish Enterprise (its home organization—a 
highly capable local economic development organization) even GlobalScot failed to 
utilize the ideas and connections from GlobalScot members. The GlobalScot is now 
increasingly forging connections between its members and businesses in Scotland by-
passing Scottish Enterprises. 
Chile takes inspiration from GlobalScot and is currently in the process of designing a 
programme called ChileGlobal. It is housed in Foundation Chile, a premier and highly 
idiosyncratic business innovation organization, which designs and finances business   8
innovation projects. ChileGlobal, a network of about 60 (as of May 2005) influential 
Chileans in USA, Canada and Europe, is a natural extension of the core business of 
Foundation Chile. The Foundation is an incubator of search networks, and ChileGlobal 
is seen as yet another such search network, albeit special. 
 
Box 1 How the search network is useful for home countries: examples of GlobalScot  
—  An inward investment project was identified through one of the first founding members 
to respond to the invitation to participate in GlobalScot. It has now brought an internet 
licensing company to Glasgow, initially employing eight people which, according to the 
founder will ‘quickly become a multi-million pound business’. 
—  An electronic engineering company that designs, tests, and manufactures innovative 
condition monitoring systems, received, within a day of requesting, a full day’s advice 
on how to agree to a licensing deal with a large US blue chip company at a crucial 
stage of negotiations.  
—  A specialist training provider to the international oil and gas industry, looking for an 
entry point into the Gulf of Mexico was connected to a GlobalScot (ex-President of 
Enterprise Oil, Gulf of Mexico) who introduced them to a number of oil and gas 
companies in the region leading to business with several of the companies and a firm 
foothold in the market. 
—  A company specializing in the creation of virtual characters for gaming software was 
able to make valuable connections with a number of global Scots during a trip to 
California for an exhibition. A non-executive director at the company described the 
contacts as ‘an absolute bullseye target for the type of business advice needed ... 
people you would never dream of trying to reach as there would usually be about a 
dozen gatekeepers between you’. 
—  A GlobalScot member who is VP Production Procurement at IBM, donated one day a 
month to working with SE’s electronics team, providing insight into the global 
electronics sector by advising on new product developments, growing and shrinking 
markets and new opportunities. 
—  A University of Strathclyde spinout company, developing the application of innovative 
3-D display technology for use in medical imaging sectors and oil industries requested 
access to US-based GlobalScots who could advise on the commercial development of 
imaging technology. Thirty-two members in the medical imaging sector responded 
immediately, resulting in valuable relationships which saved initial consultancy fees 
and opened doors into commercial entities that would have been inaccessible 
otherwise. 
—  A GlobalScot member who is Chief Scientist & VP Research and Development for a 
West Coast US Biotechnology company undertook a two-day tour of the Scottish 
biotechnology sector which directly influenced SE’s Biotechnology Framework for 
Action. Back in California, he engaged other life sciences members in implementing 
his report, resulting in a programme to develop internships for Scottish life science 
students within Californian firms. 
—  ITI Scotland is a £450 million, ten-year project to encourage and support pre-
competitive research in key market areas with strong economic and business 
development potential. GlobalScot members were actively involved in the initial 
consultation process ensuring that final proposals were specifically targeted to 
address the particular strengths of the Scottish economy. One member, President of 
University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute, also delivered a virtual address at the 
launch of ITI Scotland, observing that ‘extremely innovative, cross-cutting research 
was already underway’. 
Source: M. McRae, Head, GlobalScot, Scottish Enterprise 
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Our point that search networks help uncover partial solutions that are working can be 
illustrated by the case of Mexico. Mexican Ministry of Science and Technology views 
about a million of tertiary-educated Mexicans in the US (about 400,000 of them in 
managerial positions) as a unique opportunity which Mexico has not even started to 
explore. Hence, with advisory assistance from the World Bank, CONACYT started 
‘Red de Talentos para Innovacion’—a network of talents for innovation—its own 
search network similar to ChileGlobal and GlobalScot. 
However, by its very nature search networks are inter-disciplinary and inter-
organizational: they bridge boundaries and articulate new projects by finding previously 
unnoticed similarities. This is why bridge organizations such as Fundacion Chile and 
Scottish enterprise are so critical: they serve as incubators of search networks. But in 
Mexico there is nothing similar to Fundacion Chile. Moreover, there is no tradition of 
meaningful inter-organizational communication and joint action. There is no dearth of 
inter-ministerial councils to coordinate issues but they tend to be cartels of established 
interests, an arena where each agency protects its turf. Moreover, in a corporativist 
structure every such action was mandated from the very top, and breakdowns of the 
corporativist system resulted in a governance paralysis at a federal level. To proceed, 
the Mexico Talent Abroad programme required creative and day-to-day collaboration 
between Ministry of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Science 
and Technology (CONACYT). A solution (an unintended one?) found by a high-
ranking official of CONACYT was simple yet brilliant. He instituted a series of 
meetings of relevant agencies which were held on Saturdays. The fact that the meetings 
were outside the established routines helped to open a meaningful discussion and to 
define a new agenda of concerted action. Management of the programme is done by 
Mexican Enterprise Accelerator in San Jose, California which is established by the 
Ministry of Economy. All these are embryos of a possible future Fundacion Chile yet to 
be invented in the Mexico context. Hence, a humble and small (judged by its cost to the 
government purse) diaspora programme is an important organizational innovation to 
discover post-corporativist governance structure for the country. 
This is an example of how diaspora networks help formalize other networks while 
making them more effective as a means for incubating new programmes as governance 
structures as well as new projects. Now that we have an idea of how serendipity in the 
formation of diaspora networks can be transformed (through Saturdays-only meetings or 
otherwise) into more systematic ‘guided serendipity’, let us turn to the discussion of 
lessons of the design of deliberate programmes to utilize diasporas of talent for the 
benefits of the home countries. 
4  Turning diaspora networks into search networks: Interventions to trigger 
guided serendipity 
This section provides some observation on how deliberate action can trigger diaspora 
networks. We describe a series of light touch interventions which guide the serendipity 
of diaspora networks and transform them into sophisticated search networks.   10
4.1  Turning ‘transactions’ into ‘discussions: project development vs. project 
financing’ 
Diaspora members can be useful to their home countries in two broadly defined modes 
of involvement: ‘discussions’ and ‘transactions’. ‘Discussions’ include websites, 
conferences, workshops, on-line communications and other activities helping diaspora 
members get to know each other, connect with each other and define in which way they 
can contribute to the development of their home countries. ‘Transactions’ involve 
actions usually requiring time commitment and sometimes, although not necessarily, or 
even desirably, monetary contributions. 
Diaspora activities are easy to start but very difficult to sustain. Enthusiasm to get 
involved is enormous and it feeds into diaspora web sites, conferences and other 
meetings. Those do not require major commitments of either personal time or money. 
But initial enthusiasm tends to evaporate as easily as it emerges: people get tired of 
meetings and discussions alone. The most common mistake is to be carried away by 
discussions (organizing diaspora conferences) without turning them into tangible 
outcomes like projects. People usually like to see tangible outcomes: joint research 
projects with home country scientists, helping a start-up in the home country find new 
markets. Let us call these tangible activities ‘transactions’ or ‘projects’. A project then 
is a set of discreet activities and outcomes which can be measured. A project can be as 
small as a visit of a university professor to a home country, but it does require active 
commitment in terms of personal time and money. 
What we are after in diaspora programmes is eliciting commitments of diaspora 
members. The commitment can come in terms of time related to development of project 
and in terms of money—financing a project. A project can be commercial or 
philanthropic, although this dichotomy is becoming increasingly obsolete. 
The biggest and most typical case is ‘feeling good’ donations—small amount of cash 
from many dispersed members of diaspora. Large ‘showcase’ donations are different as 
they come from a few wealthy individuals but in the end they share a common feature—
they are all about money and require little personal engagement in designing and 
supervising the projects that these donations would be financing. 
Triggering a process to transform ‘discussions’ into ‘transactions’ appears to be a key 
issue. Most diaspora initiatives run out of steam (and thus eventually fail) because they 
cannot transformation from discussions to projects. Many diaspora initiatives naïvely 
assume that initial enthusiasm would spontaneously result in something tangible and the 
enthusiasm will continue forever. The central issue is a long gestation period from 
initial discussions to commitments (particularly when large commitments are involved). 
All too often results are expected quickly. This is a valid attitude since visible 
demonstrable effects are what keep the process going. A recommendation then is to start 
with small commitments and small projects and increase them gradually and 
incrementally, with accumulation of trust and experience. Commitments may start from 
occasional lectures at a home university, supervision of a project of a talented student 
and grow, gradually and incrementally, to a large research project (in case of scientific 
networks) or business project (in case of business network of managers and 
entrepreneurs).   11
This blend of trust and experience is credibility. Credibility is a central issue and must 
be earned by all participants in the process. Given that many diaspora members were 
involved in the past in many activities which started with good intentions yet failed 
because a key actor (usually the government) was unable to keep its commitments, it 
does pay off to start small and produce small but tangible outcomes as a demonstration 
to win the hearts and minds of sceptics. Such a demonstration effect can be celebrated in 
meetings, conferences and workshops. The proposed sequence then is from small 
discussions to small transactions and only then to large discussions which are convened 
to generate, gradually with time, larger transactions. The usual sequence is large 
discussions which gradually devolve into small discussions because there are no 
transactions to focus the energy of the participants and maintain the momentum of the 
process. 
4.2  Key role of individual champions to initiate the process and organizations to 
sustain it 
When credibility is not yet developed, key individual champions initiate the process by 
investing their own social capital: they bring people together for a cause, the 
mobilization of diaspora in our case. It is difficult to overestimate the role of individuals 
in triggering a sensible process of diaspora mobilization. When little else is available or 
can be trusted, they are the key institutions. They make connections, ameliorate 
scepticism and propose project ideas. They move the process forward against all odds. 
Usually such champions combine their commitment as an individual with a high 
position in a formal hierarchy: they use resources and organizational ‘weight’ to initiate 
the process. 
Many diaspora initiatives failed because they failed to identify such champions and to 
make sure they stay involved for a sufficiently long time. In the absence of individuals 
with high personal credibility, there is very little that can lend credibility to an insipient 
diaspora process, particularly because governments begin with very little credibility. 
Individuals are crucial to initiate the process; it is home country organizations which 
sustain it. Quality of home country organizations appears to be the single most 
important determinant of diaspora initiatives. Diasporas could be massive, rich, and 
entrepreneurial and have a lot of enthusiasm to get involved, yet it is home country 
organizations which invariably become binding constraints. A kind of paradox (don’t 
diasporas, by definition, reside outside the country?) but it shows, again and again, that 
diasporas are no panacea. Diaspora members live outside the country but once they 
engage the home country, they become constrained by its institutions. True, they can do 
a lot; perhaps more than anyone else, to relax these constraints in the longer run, but in 
the short-term they will feel its bite quite strongly. This is why Chile and Scotland have 
had much more success in interactions with their diasporas, even though these diasporas 
are small and less resource-rich than diasporas of Armenia and Argentina (countries 
with weak governments and inconsistent policies). 
Huge variation in quality and sheer diversity of home country organizations creates a 
tremendous number of organizational paths to generate credible commitments of 
diaspora members.   12
One can see both induced developments when a government programme serves as a 
trigger. The evolution is from individuals to government organizations to non-
government organizations, and spontaneous development, from key individuals outside 
the government to professional diaspora associations playing a key role, to government 
organizations gradually assuming an increasingly important role. Spontaneous 
development tends to be sufficient in the case of large countries and large diasporas 
(China and India are two paragons) while the induced development is necessary for 
small countries and small diasporas. 
In the environment of weak home country institutions, donors could play a stronger role 
in diaspora mobilization. Donors are engaged with the country anyway, despite its 
institutional weaknesses. Using diaspora as a partner for development provides donors 
with one more instrument. This could be a cost-effective channel to provide 
development assistance, with a considerable upside gain if things suddenly turn out 
well. As an example one could consider Iraqi transitional government as a major pilot 
for the US to use diaspora for achieving development goals. 
5  Why search networks are becoming ubiquitous? Implications of profound 
restructuring of value chains 
5.1  From hierarchies to search networks 
In the traditional organization headquarters set broad goals and successively lower 
levels of managers decomposed those goals into narrower and narrower ones. 
Eventually organizational routines specified in great detail how to parse and execute 
tasks, and verify their execution (Chandler 1977). 
After roughly 1980, the textbook organization became federated and open. Decisions of 
higher units are shaped by lower ones; the lower units can be formally outside the 
organization. As information in this new organization flows up and down as well as 
sideways, the organizations are said to be networked. General designs are set 
provisionally by the highest level and revised in light of proposals by internal and 
external ‘lower’ level units responsible for executing key subsystems. Rule following no 
longer entails exact obedience to orders, as in hierarchies, but rather the obligation to 
propose a new rule when the current one arguably defeats its purpose (Nohria and 
Eccles 1992). 
The networked firms arise from and are built to facilitate the iterative process of co-
design whereby internal and external suppliers contribute to the redefinition of 
specifications for (components of) new products based on their experience in 
manufacturing existing models. These collaborative, co-design disciplines are utterly 
familiar (to practitioners) under the name of Japanese production methods, although 
they are no longer limited to Japanese firms or those in close association with them. So   13
pervasive are these practices that it is almost impossible to survey recent writings about 
the global economy without stumbling across extended reference to them.
2 
These methods establish a first idea of what to produce (and how) through 
benchmarking: an exacting survey of current products and processes, supplemented by 
assessments of new and unproved techniques that might become available for use. Once 
benchmarking provides a provisional starting point, design follows a disciplined, 
decentralized process known as simultaneous engineering. Each subunit responsible for 
a constituent component proposes modifications of the initial plan, while also 
considering the implication of like proposals from the other subunits for its own 
activities. Provisional designs are thus evaluated and refined, and the cost of each 
attribute is compared to its contribution to functionality using the techniques of value 
analysis/value engineering. Once production begins, systems of error detection and 
correction use breakdowns in the new routines to trigger searches for weaknesses of the 
design or production process that escaped earlier examination.
3 The goal of such root 
cause analysis is to trace disruption back to its original source, which may not be 
palpably linked to the proximate cause of the breakdown. Moreover, the exchanges of 
information required to engage in benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error 
detection and correction also allow the collaborators to monitor one another’s activities, 
closely enough to detect performance failures and deception before they lead to 
disastrous consequences. Ultimately, these information exchanges lead the actors to 
convergent understandings of the world they are exploring. We can think of these 
disciplines as pragmatist, in the sense that they oblige firms routinely to question the 
suitability of their current routines and continuously to readjust their ends and means to 
one another in light of the results of such questioning.
4 
Taken together, these new pragmatist disciplines play an important part both in 
mitigating the cognitive self-limitation at the heart of the innovator’s dilemma and in 
shaping the links that connect firms in the new economy to each other. They increase 
the mutual transparency of the actors essentially by revealing to each how widely and 
rigorously the others scan for solutions in addressing joint problems of design or 
quality. In the form of benchmarking or root-cause analysis, for example, they require 
the actors to undertake searches that are unbounded ex ante (consider all the products 
“like” the one you want to build; assume that the root cause of a problem will have no 
direct connection to the proximate cause), yet sufficiently informative to produce a 
serviceable map of the available solution space. As each party monitors the others’ 
search process, tacit knowledge is rendered at least partly explicit, easing long-range 
collaboration (by reducing the chances that the parties take incompatible things for 
                                                 
2   Thus, for example, in discussing the value of long-term collaborative relationships based on voice 
rather than exit, Lamoreaux et al. (2003) refer to Spear and Kent Bowen (1999). This article provides 
a useful discussion of the disciplines by which Toyota tests and revises the assumptions. 
3   Langlois (2002: 24) notes the possibility of using disruption as a cue for problem solving and 
continuous improvement, but confuses the form of tight coupling by just-in-time inventory systems 
with the non-decomposability of production and erroneously concludes that it would be beneficial 
‘only for some kinds of relatively stable systems where frequent change is not important’. Any 
textbook on Japanese production methods will demonstrate that root-cause analysis and related 
problem-solving techniques are especially useful to reduce set-up times and otherwise facilitate small-
batch production in volatile environments. 
4   For a fuller discussion, on which this presentation draws, see Helper et al. (2000).   14
granted) and reducing the chance that all the parties cling to the same dangerously 
limited assumption (by routinely disrupting the disposition to take the same things for 
granted. These disciplines thus decompose complex systems into recombinable chunks 
while providing elements of a form of governance of intra- and inter-firm relations that 
are based neither on traditional, highly detailed contracts (or relational variants of them) 
or on trust born of long familiarity. Put in another way, these disciplines point towards a 
form of flexible or continuously corrigible formalization that blurs the distinction 
between tacit and fully explicit knowledge, on the one hand, and between informal and 
rigidly specified governance on the other. Linking actors in this way, the disciplines of 
iterative co-design create structures—search networks—that allow potential 
collaborators both to redefine the problems they face and make use of (partial) solutions 
that were unlikely to be counted as such until the problem itself was recast to reveal the 
connection. 
Network organizations relying on such search networks manifestly out-perform 
hierarchies in volatile environments, where goals change so quickly that reducing them 
to a seamless set of task specifications is highly risky, if it is possible at all. Specifically, 
in such environments the open, federated organization can produce a more useful and 
resilient design for a product or service by canvassing more alternatives in less time 
than a hierarchy with a like purpose (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Ward et al. 1995). 
Often the network organization can achieve simultaneously three goals—cutting 
development time while increasing the utility and reliability of designs—which 
hierarchies are thought to have to trade against each other, and that only in stable 
environments. 
5.2  Supply chains, modules and clusters 
This reading of the organizational transformation of the large firm suggests an 
understanding of global supply chains, and of the room for manoeuvre of suppliers in 
developing economies, at odds with two influential but contrary views of these 
structures. The first view assumes that subsystems and large components can be defined 
by the lead producer or by the large retailer who will sell the final product with 
sufficient precision that suppliers (and suppliers to the first-tier suppliers, and so on 
down) can produce what is needed simply by following instructions. This is the 
hierarchical division of labour dispersed on a global scale to take advantage of low 
wages and other locational advantages. It makes the developing country suppliers who 
participate in these ‘commodity chains’ almost completely dependent on the designs, in 
all senses, of the lead, rich country producer or retailer. But there is overwhelming 
evidence, in industries as varied as chip design, automobile parts, running shoes and 
sports clothing that the kind of robust modularity and fixity of design required for such 
a strategy is simply unsustainable given the rapidity of changes in markets and 
technology. Hence in all these industries suppliers are being pressed to expand their 
design capacities, or, better, their capacity to engage in iterated co-design; and as they 
do, of course, they increase their ability to engage new customers, enter new markets, 
and generally increase their autonomy. 
The second and contrary view says that it is not (a new type of) highly detailed 
instructions that make possible a global supply chain, rather the (new?) capacity to 
engage in highly informal relations, over long distances, that explains the current 
decentralization of production. Economists sometimes model this development as a   15
variant of familiar repeat-play games. More often it is discussed in terms of clusters or 
industrial districts—geographically concentrated groups of firms in the same or related 
industries which together respond flexibly to changing demand based on their long 
history of collaboration. Global supply chains, on this view, are connecting into, or 
helping to create such clusters or districts, although it is unclear just how much 
autonomy they have with respect to their lead customers. 
Although this view is right in seeing the current unit of production as groups of firms 
(and external organizations providing complementary services that small and medium-
sized producers cannot provide themselves), and also right to see that geographic 
proximity is still relevant to production in a global age, it overlooks a substantial body 
of new evidence showing that mastery of the pragmatist disciplines is a precondition for 
participation in global supply chains as much for firms in established, advanced country 
clusters and as for firms in developing economy clusters that are just now forming or 
struggling to ‘upgrade’ their position in the hierarchy of skill.  
5.3  Hybrids and their implication for governance 
In arguing that pragmatic collaboration, and not modularity or informalism, is the 
distinctive structuring principle of the globalizing, new economy, we do not mean to 
suggest that all relations within and among firms in the new economy are, or will soon 
be pragmatically collaborative. On the contrary, it is evident that customers and 
suppliers within and outside of districts frequently maintain a mix of relations with their 
various partners, engaging in iterated co-design with some, repeat but informal 
collaboration with others, while working at arm’s length—perhaps on the basis of 
modular standards—with still others. The reasons for the persistence of these 
‘traditional’ forms of collaboration are in part transitional—related to problems of 
strategic coordination between customers and suppliers both anxious to minimize the 
costs to themselves of moving to new forms of cooperation—and in part fundamental—
related to the very nature of iterated co-design itself. In practice the two sets of reasons 
will often blur together, but it is useful to distinguish them for analytic purposes, as we 
will do briefly here. 
The transitional problems of strategic co-ordination result immediately from the trade 
off faced by, say, a large customer entertaining dealings with a range of potential 
suppliers. From the customer’s standpoint, of course, the ideal supplier would be the 
most capable designer as well as the lowest cost, most reliable producer. But even if 
pragmatic collaborators can offer bundles of design capacity, efficiency and reliability 
that cannot be matched by traditional suppliers; at any moment there are almost surely 
some modularizing competitors offering, say, a combination of minimally acceptable 
levels of design capacity and reliability at highly advantageous prices. Whether the 
customer contracts with the low-cost supplier rather than the pragmatic collaborator will 
depend at least as much, and probably more, on the conflicting short term concerns of 
operating managers—the need, for instance, to turn a big profit on this deal, rather than 
worry about next-generation design—as on the strategic vision of the higher ups. 
Thus customers will engage in co-design with some—but only some, and not always the 
same—actors all the time, while dealing traditionally with the rest. Faced with the 
apparent inconsistency of the customer’s relation to them, suppliers will hedge their 
own behaviour to survive being at arm’s-length as well as (different kinds) of   16
cooperation. Their responses in turn permit, and may encourage, continuation of the 
customers’ strategic vacillations. 
This transitional confusion is compounded by an ambiguity at the heart of iterated co-
design. We saw that iterated co-design emerges in response to both the need to 
formalize collaboration in volatile conditions and the impossibility of doing so 
completely. It uses devices such as benchmarking and error-detection and correction to 
trigger disciplined discussions of what can, at any moment, usefully be formalized, and 
how. But in the end these devices are only aides to discussion: they reduce the 
possibility of ignorant, complacent mistakes, without guaranteeing far-sighted 
decisions. In the end, as usual, actors, not algorithms, decide strategic questions. In 
particular, what to formalize, even assuming the most benign collaborators imaginable, 
remains at the margin a matter of judgement, even if the judgement is informed by 
application of new, pragmatic formalisms. Large customers, with their highly 
institutionalized division of responsibilities between marketing, design, and sourcing are 
especially likely to get caught in disputes about short-term advantages of different 
supply relations. Small and medium suppliers, lacking the resources fully to assess their 
long-term possibilities, or recover from badly misplaced bets, are especially likely to be 
daunted by deep strategic ambiguity, and hence to waver erratically between choices too 
timid and too bold. While iterated co-design is arguably central to the new economy in 
setting the standard by which other forms of collaboration are judged and providing the 
tools for refining those judgments, for the foreseeable future, traditional relations will 
continue to exist alongside the innovate ones (though, to raise a consideration we cannot 
pursue here, the traditional character of these relations is likely to be coloured and 
perhaps transformed by their association with the novel types). 
A corollary to this clarification of the role of pragmatic collaboration is that 
governance—here the institutions that shape firms’ decisions about their internal 
organization and relations to collaborators—matters at least as much in the new 
economy as in the old. Where the ground-level or first-order actors such as corporate 
purchasing departments or district firms face problems of short-term strategic co-
ordination and long-term strategic uncertainty, the danger is particularly great that well 
founded local decisions will produce disastrous global outcomes. Governance 
institutions that reduce the chances of stumbling into such traps by providing the actors 
with information they would not otherwise have before they decide, and then helping 
them catch errors early through deliberate, periodic review of their decisions are in such 
circumstances especially valuable. We will see that the idea of search networks turns 
out to be as relevant to this economy wide problem as to problems of intra- and inter-
firm organization 
6  Policy implications: new industrial policy 
Industrial policy is a set of instruments to upgrade firms and promote economic 
restructuring. Vertical industrial policy sometimes associated with ‘picking winners’ 
was focused on promotion of backward and forward linkages. Its successes (South 
Korea, Japan) are spectacular and well known, and so are the failures. Traditional 
industrial policy has three set of problems:    17
—  Cognitive limitations: ‘picking winners’ in modern fast-changing industries is 
next to impossible. ‘Winners’ are continuously evolving: this is a self-
discovery problem 
—  Very limited capacity of public sector to make an informed choice: capability 
problem 
—  Capture by vested/ entrenched interests: a problem of dis-entrenchment 
A key concept of new industrial policy—search networks—allows a resolution to these 
problems. The example of creation of venture capital industry in Taiwan (see Saxenian 
2006 for more details) helps to clarify how. 
When the Taiwanese government decided to promote venture capital industry in the 
beginning of the 1980s, it had neither the capabilities, nor a blueprint to do that. 
Furthermore, the concept of venture capital was foreign to traditional Taiwanese 
practice, in which family members closely controlled all of a business’s financial 
affairs—entrenched interests were strong. Through a process of intense interactions 
with the Taiwanese diaspora in Silicon Valley, new institutions such as Seed Fund (with 
initial allocation of NT$800 million, later complemented by additional 1.6 billion) 
provided matching capital contributions to private venture capital funds. 
Two American-style venture funds: H&Q Asia Pacific and Walden International 
Investment Group were created in the mid-1980s. They were managed by US-educated 
overseas Chinese who received invitations to reallocate to Taiwan. Once first venture 
funds proved successful, domestic IT firms created their own VC funds. Once those 
started to pay-off, even the conservative family groups started to invest in venture 
capital funds and IT businesses. 
A search network consisting initially of key members of Taiwanese government and 
leading overseas Chinese engineers in Silicon Valley was central in the emergence of 
modern venture capital industry in a very unlikely place dominated by conservative and 
risk-averse business groups. This search network didn’t have a blueprint, yet did have a 
role model (Silicon Valley) and a clear idea of ‘what to do next’. By defining each 
subsequent step along the road, the search network became wider, with eventual 
incorporation of sceptics and opponents. The venture capital industry in Taiwan was co-
designed and co-created by this search network in exactly the same way as a new model 
of car is co-designed in Japanese methods of simultaneous engineering discussed in the 
previous section. 
—  The solution to the problem of creating new industries (?), when almost no 
elements exist to create it, is revolutionary incrementalism. This means step by 
step transformation of bad public and private features by drawing first on the 
exceptions from the general rule. This in turn requires using internal diversity 
to find better performing parts of each, and matching them. 
—  This is just what search networks do. 
—  In the case of Taiwan venture capital industry, the diaspora networks proved 
critical to trigger a dynamic and resilient search network. To be more specific, 
it was a case of dual (government and diaspora) leadership. Yet in many 
instances search networks emerge in a more low-key way, with the 
government playing a supporting role. Supplier development programmes in 
the case in point.   18
Supplier development programmes are a joint effort of buyers (usually more capable 
and large companies) and potential suppliers (usually small and medium-sized 
enterprises) to upgrade potential suppliers so that they can meet buyer’ requirements of 
quality and reliability. It tends to be a multi-year effort which starts with a lot of 
discussions between buyers and (potential?) suppliers but eventually leads to 
transactions. Private sector actors invest most of the resources and take most of the risk. 
The role of the private sector is to bring the two sides together and to provide a 
disciplined framework, with benchmarks for progress, for their dialogue.  The search 
network in this case consists of representatives of buyer and supplier companies, the 
government and consultants assisting the process. This search network not so much 
‘picks’ but nourishes the winners among SMEs chosen as qualified potential suppliers. 
A good supplier development programme is not another ‘SME programme’ in addition 
to a dizzying number of existing but rather a framework programme allowing to draw 
on the overcrowded policy field to satisfy specific training, financing, quality upgrading 
and other needs of SMEs. In doing this matching of viable elements of existing 
programmes to specific needs, a concerted action between agents which rarely talk to 
each other—a central problem in most developing countries—is starting to emerge. 
Thus, drawing on heterogeneity of both private and public sector—and bringing 
together officials willing to experiment and take risks—supplier development 
programmes (and search networks in general) create embryos of the new public sector. 
The logic of diaspora initiatives is exactly the same. A sending country is an analogue 
of SME in the supply chain and a central objective is generation of a ‘win-win’ between 
sending and receiving countries. 
In a nutshell, new industrial policy is about generating missing connections. It is a 
response to unresolved issues of vertical and horizontal industrial policies: how to create 
growth-promoting connections without opening the door to rent seeking. 
7 Conclusions 
The chapter views migration of skills from a perspective of new industrial policy. More 
specifically it introduces two types of search networks: open migration chains and 
diaspora networks. Migration chains are sequences of educational or job opportunities 
which allow a migrant to move to progressively complex educational and job tasks 
necessary to work in the global environment. Diaspora networks are networks of 
diaspora members to advance their collective goals, often (but not necessarily) for the 
benefits of home countries. Open migration chains are functional equivalents of value 
chains: they emphasize upgrading of individual human capital. Diaspora networks are 
about concerted action and clubs. They can be viewed as tools to upgrade open 
migration chains exactly the same way as supplier development programme is a 
concerted action to upgrade value chains. 
Although at the first glance, juxtaposing global migration of skills in the context of 
restructuring of firms and value chains obscures more than it clarifies: open migration 
chains and diaspora networks are not (yet) familiar concepts. Yet the parallels we 
outline is the main contribution of the paper.   19
First, from an analytical perspective, value chains, open migration chains just as 
deliberate interventions to upgrade them are the search networks that allow us to find 
and collaborate with those who are already learning what we need to know. Second, 
from a purely pragmatic policy perspective such a parallel may be helpful for a 
policymaker. Simply put, we know much more about the intricacies of designing good 
supplier development programmes than about how to design good diaspora initiatives. 
Lessons from a more mature policy experiment are therefore helpful to an incipient 
policy experiment—the design of diaspora networks to benefit home countries. 
Our perspective is both ambitious and humble. It is ambitiously optimistic because 
emerging migration ladders open an opportunity of a win-win situation—an evolving 
virtuous cycle of co-development of migrant human capital and home country 
institutions. It is humble, however, in recognizing intricacies of policy solutions to make 
it happen. As a previous section showed, creation of a robust diaspora network as a 
search network requires substantial amount of time, patience and institutional 
capabilities. Above all, good expatriate networks—as any search networks—tend to 
generate opportunities and projects but someone else has to act on those opportunities 
and finance the projects. Capabilities of government and private sector stakeholders 
remain the key: diaspora networks are no panacea. 
On an ambitious note, this chapter contributes to a discussion on so-called new 
industrial policy viewed as a set of interventions which is distinct from the ‘old’ 
functional / horizontal industrial policy of the 1980s and 1990s, yet capable of avoiding 
familiar old pitfalls of ‘picking winners’—is becoming a subject of policy debate and 
experimentation. As our example of Mexico in section 4 highlighted, well-designed 
diaspora programmes can contribute both to the creation of new public sector and new 
industrial policy. Their significance therefore extends beyond the narrowly defined 
issues of international mobility of talent. 
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